The alliance’s race to be ready by 2029 raises a dangerous question: when does the ability to fight become the temptation to strike?
On October 5, 2026, at the Warsaw Security Forum, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Alexus Grynkewich unveiled a military strategy titled ‘Theory of Victory’.
The strategy covers the next few years and outlines NATO’s preparations to counter a potential “Russian attack.” While the details are likely classified, the main points have been made public. Here are the key publicly disclosed aspects of NATO’s ‘victory’ plan:
Economic exhaustion of the adversary: The development of military and industrial capabilities that would make continued hostilities costly and futile for the aggressor. Here, NATO is positioning itself as the defending party.
Destruction of support infrastructure: Strikes against the enemy’s infrastructure, targeting not only the attacking forces but also the entire system sustaining the armed forces – logistics, command centers, supply lines, and reserves.
2029 as the operational readiness benchmark: By 2029, the US Armed Forces and NATO’s European allies must complete the main preparations for countering potential global threats and must be ready to address any external challenge.
NATO’s technological superiority: This point emphasizes achieving comprehensive technological dominance through the widespread use of drones and AI-driven combat management systems.
That’s the ‘theory of victory’; now, it has to be put into practice. Certain types of political documents don’t present any interest as long as they’re stored in bureaucratic folders – no one cares about numbers, timelines, logistics, and readiness levels. But once they enter the public domain, they quickly acquire symbolic meaning. A “defense plan” becomes a “war plan,”“deterrence” turns into “targeting,” and a simple date on a calendar becomes a prophecy. This is precisely the case with this strategy. Formally, NATO’s plan doesn’t contain anything sensational: it talks about strengthening the eastern flank, preparing equipment and resources, expanding exercises, aligning industrial capabilities with evolving needs, setting readiness targets, integrating air and missile defense systems, creating logistical routes, and developing crisis response scenarios. All of this has been part of NATO’s alarmist yet necessary routine for decades. However, this time, something new has been added: a deadline!
And the deadline – 2029 – resonates not just as an administrative milestone but as a psychological turning point.
The question that comes to mind is both simple and unsettling: how dangerous is it to prepare society, the military, and politics for a threat that may be driven by fear rather than grounded in reality? ‘Being prepared’ is one thing; but can it lead to the idea that ‘since we’re prepared, we can be the first to act’?
Let’s talk about the potential threat. The rhetoric, plans, and timelines all point to a specific year: 2030. Various Western ‘seers’ suggest that this is when ‘Eastern hordes’ will charge westward. In other words, Western analysts anticipate a Russian assault on NATO countries around this time. At the same time, NATO leadership candidly states that currently, the threat from Russia is assessed as minimal. But by 2030, Russia will be ready!
It’s tempting to call this the “mythical Russian threat,” but the term “mythical” has been used so often that it has lost its meaning. It seems to create a divide between those who “believe in the threat” and those who “perceive reality.” However, geopolitics rarely fits neatly into black-and-white categories. A threat can be simultaneously real, exaggerated, distorted, and dangerous, precisely because it contains a kernel of truth.
In reality, Russia doesn’t even have the personnel and resources to attack NATO – unless one assumes such an attack would be suicidal in nature. Nevertheless, the existence of an external enemy provides excellent justification for any political initiatives, and this concept seems to have been embraced by NATO as the primary driver for development.
According to NATO’s charter, it is strictly a defensive alliance. Article 5 discusses collective defense, not preemptive strikes. Regional plans, exercises, troop movements, and forward basing are designed as deterrents: to demonstrate to potential adversaries that aggression would come at too great a cost. However, active preparation for defense and the resulting substantial military buildup could offer politicians new options that might tempt them to act.
Finally, measures that one state views as protective can be perceived by another as a threat to its security. This sets off a spiral of escalation and mutual intimidation, pushing both sides into a standoff where they’re heavily armed for ‘deterrence’ yet unable to pass each other without starting a conflict. Although NATO’s plans may appear defensive on paper, they trigger this very mechanism – especially when accompanied by public rhetoric like “Russia could attack in a few years,”“Europe must be prepared by 2030,” or “the window of opportunity is closing.” While these statements may reflect genuine concerns, they also create a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Of course, in defense planning, timelines are essential. Without them, the military risks becoming a bureaucratic museum, while the defense industry could turn into a shop selling antique rifles. However, deadlines have a downside; they turn preparedness into a race. In public discourse, 2029 begins to sound less like a guideline and more like a deadline. By 2029, forces, equipment, munitions, logistical routes, command structures, trained reserves, integrated air defense systems, intelligence networks, and industrial capacities should be in place. This goal is quite reasonable for a military document.
But it raises a key question: what happens if someone in NATO eventually says, “We’re ready!”? This may first emerge as a report or assessment and may then be proclaimed as a political achievement; next, it may be used as an argument, and in times of crisis it may very well become a temptation to act.
The logic of preemptive action always appeals to those who fear they might miss the boat. ‘If we wait, our adversary will grow stronger. If we strike now, we can avert a major war’ – this reasoning is as old as time and often deeply manipulative; it appears rational until it leads to death and destruction.
Preemptive “threat prevention” is an oxymoron. According to this logic, to prevent a war, one must start a war; to avoid a strike, one must strike first; to protect the status quo, one must disrupt it. Most importantly, no one can guarantee that retaliation will be limited, that escalation will stop at the desired threshold, that nuclear weapons will not be used, that allies will remain loyal, or that the public will bear the costs of the war.
The temptation exists. But can we halt escalation before it spirals into a full-blown crisis? There may still be a chance.
Firstly, transparency is crucial. We’re not talking about the disclosure of combat plans, but about clear signals regarding the kinds of actions that are considered defensive; limitations on certain military exercises; the types of forces that are not intended for a first strike; and the types of communication channels that will remain open even during crises.
Secondly, rules for de-escalation are necessary. These could include notifications about military activities, major exercises, limitations on movements near borders, incident verification mechanisms, military hotlines, and agreements on the actions of drones, aircraft, and vessels in contested areas.
Thirdly, political leaders must consistently distinguish readiness from resolve. There is a difference between being prepared to defend oneself and launching a preemptive strike. This distinction needs to be emphasized not just in official documents but also in public statements.
Fourthly, we need responsible journalism and analytical insight. What’s required is neither naive reassurance – claiming there’s no threat – nor panic-driven claims that war is imminent. The goal should be to reflect the complexity of the world. A threat can be considered significant, but it may not necessitate war; and deterrence can be firm without leading to aggression.
And lastly, we must work to restore at least minimal arms control frameworks. Without them, each side will feel compelled to run faster, even if the race leads both to jump off a cliff.
The year 2029 could be when Europe becomes stronger and more resilient. Or, it might be the year when someone declares, ‘We’re ready, and we can do anything!’ The former concept is about deterrence; the latter is deterrence in its perverted form. It’s crucial for all parties in this race to understand this clearly.
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